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CASE COMMENTS

Today's proliferation of paper work, together with the growing
size and complexity of government at all levels-local, state and
national-will tend to place increasing pressure on courts and
legislatures to adequately define which records are to be public,
and who may have access to them. In determining the answers
to these questions, it will be necessary to balance the interest of
the public at large in having complete freedom of access to all
of the records of government against the factors which weigh
against permitting inspection. Among the factors weighing against
inspection are the right of privacy of the individual in the conduct
of his personal affairs, the necessity of withholding state secrets
from potential enemies and the possible disruption and loss of
governmental efficiency through making the records available
to the public. It is hoped that those whose job it is to weigh and
decide these questions will constantly recognize how vital the
openness of public affairs is to the proper functioning of a democratic society. Only when the most compelling reasons dictate
should the public be denied the right of free access to government
records.
Raymond Albert Hinerman

Torts-Absence of Privity on Implied Warranty of Fitness
The administrator of a deceased truck driver brought action
against the designer and manufacturer of a truck tire which allegedly had blown out resulting in the death of the truck driver. Damages
were sought on two counts. One count was for wrongful death
allegedly caused by the negligent manufacture and design of the
tire, and the other was for breach of implied warranty of fitness.
There was no privity of contract between the deceased and the
defendants. The trial court dismissed the count based on breach
of implied warranty, and a judgment was entered for defendants
on the negligence count. Held, negligence count affirmed and
implied warranty count reversed. The court said that neither
negligence nor privity of contract is required in Indiana in an
action for breach of implied warranty. This new concept of warranty bases liability on strict liability in tort. Dagley v. Armstrong
Rubber Co. 344 F.2d 245, (7th Cir. 1965).
The principal case is indicative of a type of warranty which is
different from those usually found in the sale of goods. The
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principle followed in this case is not to be confused with that of
the leading case of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The suit in the MacPherson case was based
on a theory of negligence, while the action in the principal case
was on implied warranty without privity of contract.
Most states still follow the view that a suit for damages resulting
from defective goods must be based on negligence or privity of
contract, and the general proposition is that the warranty extends
only to parties to the contract. Racklin v. Libby-Owens Ford Glass
Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938), Hieronymous Motor Co. v. Smith,
241 Ky. 209, 43 S.W.2d 668 (1931); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.,
235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
Only about a third of the states have extended strict liability to
the consumer, and thus far this extension has been limited to cases
concerning defective food. A few recent cases have extended the
manufacturer's strict liability without privity beyond food: Spencer
v. Three Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, N.W.2d
873 (1958), (defective building blocks resulted in damages when
used); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp. 372 S.W.2d 41 (1963),
(exrplosion of a gas stove); Chapman v. Brown 198 F. Supp. 78
(D. Hawaii, 1961), (igniting of hula skirt); Pabon v. Hackensack
Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960), (defective
steering of car resulted in wreck); Thompson v. Redman 199 F.
Supp. 120 (E.D. Penn. 1961), (accelerator pedal of automobile
stuck causing collision); Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237
F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Indiana 1965), (defective forklift truck resulting in injuries to operator).
For those states that have adopted the UNwomRm CoMMERCAL
CoDE, section 2-318 has extended the range of warranty protection
by including members of the family and household of the immediate purchaser and his guests. However, its provisions are far
from reaching the results of the Dagley case.
In reaching its decision, the court in the principal case relied
heavily upon a 1964 revision of the Restatement of Torts which
departs from the Restatement's original position and now recognizes
the concept of strict liability.
§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any product
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in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
This section is not limited to food or other goods for intimate
bodily use. Its coverage extends to any product which is in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him. It applied to any person
engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption.
Thus, it applies to any manufacturer, to any wholesale or retail
dealer or distributer and to the restaurant operator. One need not
be solely engaged in the business of selling such products for
the section to apply.
As the liability of this strict liability concept is not based upon
negligence of the seller, then contributory negligence of the plaintiff such as failing to discover the defect does not constitute a
defense. However, the user or consumer is barred from recovery
if he has discovered the defect and then has proceeded to make
use of the product. In allowing recovery under the rules of the
Restatement section the courts have only extended it to the user
or consumer and have not included the bystanders and passers-by.
The concept of strict liability makes the seller subject to liability
to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of the product. The justification
for strict liability is that the public has the right to expect sellers
to stand behind their goods. Public policy demands that the
damages of accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption fall upon the producer, and that these costs be treated
as a cost of production. The policy of strict liability might provide
a healthy and highly desirable incentive for producers to make
their products safe. 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938 (1957).
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The strict liability rule was first extended to products involving
a high degree of risk. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d
272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla.
872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio
App. 472, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); Griffin v. Ashbury, 196 Okla. 484,
165 P.2d 822 (1945); Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies,Inc., 147 Pa. Super.
39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941). Now it seems that the courts may be
arriving at a strict liability rule for all products which might be
expected to do harm if defective.
West Virginia has in the past recognized implied warranties. 63
W. VA. L. REv. 326 (1961). In Schaffer v. National Supply Co., 80
W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917), the court recognized an implied
warranty to articles other than foodstuffs where the purchaser had
disclosed the purpose for which the goods were desired and had
relied upon the seller's skill and judgment. In Pennington v. Cranberry, 117 W. Va. 680, 185 S.E. 610 (1936), the court held that in
absence of statute, the retailer does not impliedly warrant to the
consumer the contents of a sealed package of food, but only
warrants that he has purchased from a reliable manufacturer and
that there is no apparent defect. Three years later in 1939, the
West Virginia Supreme Court held that where food is purchased
from a retail dealer for immediate consumption, there is generally
an implied warranty that the article sold is fit for human consumnption. Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt., 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d
785 (1939). However, the court said by dicta that a food seller's
warranty inured only to the benefit of the purchaser. Since this
case was decided, West Virginia has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which has extended the seller's warranty to any
natural person who is in the family or household of the buyer or
who is a guest in the buyer's home, and it seems reasonable that
he may use or consume the goods. The effect of the dicta in the
Burgess case was to say that to recover on an implied warranty
it was necessary to have privity. However, a federal case applying
West Virginia law implied that absence of privity is no bar to an
action on warranty. Kyle v. Swift & Co. 229 F.2d 887 (4th Cir.
1956). The court in the Kyle case said whether the liability of
the manufacturer be held to rest upon implied contract or negligence in manufacture, ". . . [t]he evidence before us was sufficient
to take the case to the jury as against the manufacturer as well as
against the retail dealer."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/14

4

Rogers: Torts--Absence o Privacy on Implied Warranty of Fitness

1965]

CASE COMMENTS

Thus, the issue as to whether privity is necessary in West
Virginia for a suit on implied warranty is torn between dicta of
the 1939 Burgess case and the 1956 federal case. It appears that
the West Virginia position in regard to the privity question at issue
in the principal case remains to be sufficiently answered in future
litigation.
John I. Rogers, 11

Torts-The Fall of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine
P, a patient in D hospital, fell against a hot radiator while being
given a bath by a hospital orderly. P's action to recover damages
for personal injuries was based on the alleged negligence of the
orderly in failing to remove P from his peril. P also alleged negligence of D in the hiring and retention of the orderly. The trial
court, relying on the doctrine of charitable immunity, entered
summary judgment for D. Held, reversed. The court departed
from stare decisis on the ground that charitable hospitals are no
longer essentially charitable within the classical definition of the
word. Today they are managed like business corporations and
should be responsible for the torts of their servants while in the
scope of their employment. Adkins v. Saint Francis Hosp., 143
S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965).
English courts introduced the doctrine of charitable immunity
in Duncan v. Findlater,7 C1 .&F. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839),
and Feofees of Heriots Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Cl. & F. 507, 8 Eng.
Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846). It was later repudiated in Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866). Maryland and Massachusetts adopted the rule after it had been repudiated by English
courts. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495
(1885); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432,
21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
Most state courts applied the doctrine in early decisions. Through
the years many exceptions to the doctrine have been developed,
but to delineate each would be impractical. In 1940, Oklahoma
became one of the first states to abolish the charitable immunity
doctrine. Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244
(1940). In the principal case Judge Caplan cited a leading case
in this area, President & Directors of Georgetown College v.
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